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This  policy  brief  updates  our  estimates  of  fundamental 
equilibrium  exchange  rates  (FEERs)  to  the  latest  available 
data, which for exchange rates are the average rates of April 
2011, and for the IMF’s balance of payments forecasts, those 
published in the April 2011 issue of World Economic Outlook 
(WEO; see IMF 2011a). It is the central study in what has 
now become a regular annual cycle, in which we draw out 
what we believe to be the implications of the IMF’s forecasts 
for the pattern that exchange rates need to take if the world 
is  to  approach  a  reasonably  satisfactory  medium-run  posi-
tion. This past year we also published an interim policy brief 
(Cline  and  Williamson  2010b)  in  which  we  updated  our 
calculations to the average exchange rates of October 2010, 
as well as commented on Brazilian Finance Minister Guido 
Mantega’s  description  of  international  monetary  events  as 
constituting “currency wars.” As in the previous year, however, 
the November 2010 policy brief updated our estimates only 
for  intervening  changes  in  market  exchange  rates.  We  did 
not make use of the IMF’s revised autumn WEO forecasts to 
update our estimates of FEERs; on the contrary, we assumed 
the FEERs estimated in May 2010 were correct. In contrast, 
this policy brief presents totally new estimates of FEERs.
The  world  economy  is  still  recovering  from  the  Great 
Recession  of  2008–09,  but  the  recovery  is  proceeding  at 
very different paces in advanced countries versus the main 
emerging-market economies. Most advanced countries are still 
suffering from considerable excess supply and substantial fiscal 
stress, which is the main reason for easy monetary policies. 
Most emerging-market economies are, in contrast, booming. 
They have long surpassed their previous peak levels of output, 
growth is rapid, debts are lowish, unemployment is small and 
declining, and the problems that concern them are those of 
prosperity—notably inflation—rather than continued stagna-
tion. Rapid growth in emerging-market economies is stoking 
increases in commodity prices, especially of oil, which worsens 
the problems of the advanced countries, just as the problems 
of the emerging-market economies are intensified by the cap-
ital inflows they are receiving as a consequence of the easy 
monetary policies of the advanced countries.
As in previous years (Cline and Williamson 2008, 2009, 
2010a), we take as our point of departure recent figures for 
exchange rates and the projections published by the IMF in 
the latest WEO. It contains projections for individual country 
current account positions on the technical assumption of no 
further changes in real exchange rates, which probably exag-
gerates the likely size of the Chinese surplus but provides us 
In April 2011 most currencies appear 
to have been reasonably close to their 
FEERs. The most important exceptions 
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with exactly the right framework for calculating the changes 
in exchange rates that would be needed to establish sustainable 
positions. The IMF also makes projections about the course 
of commodity prices, including that of the most important 
commodity, oil. We checked the oil price assumption against 
that of the US Energy Information Administration, but since 
they were not greatly different we stuck with the assumption 
of  the  IMF  (as  we  did  with  commodity  prices).  The  IMF 
assumes an oil price of $107.16 per barrel in 2011, of $108 
per barrel in 2012, and an unchanged real oil price thereafter. 
In Cline (2011b) one of us has updated his model of the 
US balance of payments. This model projects a figure for the 
US current account deficit in 2016 of 4.3 percent of GDP, 
which is 0.9 percent larger than the IMF projection. We have 
therefore modified the IMF projections of current account 
positions in three ways.
1.  Since the exchange rates used as a base for this study are 
two months more recent than those used by the IMF, 
we added (or subtracted) the product of each country’s 
impact parameter γ (see appendix B) and its change in the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) between the IMF’s 
February base and our April base (calculating REERs by 
the trade weights in Cline’s model).
2.  We then forced the sum of the changes predicted in 2016 
current accounts to sum to zero.1 
3.  Since the IMF forecasts underestimate (in our view) the 
US current account deficit, it follows that the conversion 
to our basis requires that we distribute an additional 0.9 
percent of US 2016 GNP into current account earnings 
to the remaining 33 countries in the model, in proportion 
to country shares in US trade.
In this policy brief, we first review the concept of the 
FEER. This section can be omitted by those who recall earlier 
similar discussions. We then discuss the main assumptions 
made in deriving estimates of FEERs, which again overlap 
with last year’s discussion (Cline and Williamson 2010a). The 
third section reviews the nature of the model employed, with 
the  main  emphasis  on  Cline’s  symmetric  matrix  inversion 
method (SMIM). Many readers will also feel able to skip this 
discussion, which is again a repetition, but some may wish for 
full details of the model, which are available in Cline (2008). 
The final section contains our new results and explains why in 
some instances they differ significantly from the earlier ones.
1. The sum of positive changes exceeds the absolute value of the sum of nega-
tive changes by 27 percent. All positive changes are multiplied by the factor 
0.88 and all negative changes multiplied by the factor 1.12 to eliminate this 
discrepancy (that is: 0.88 x 1.27 = 1.12 x 1.0).
The ConCepT of The feeR
A  fundamental  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  defined  as  an 
exchange rate that is expected to be indefinitely sustainable on 
the basis of existing policies. It should therefore be one that 
is expected to generate a current account surplus or deficit 
that matches the country’s underlying capital flow over the 
cycle, assuming that the country is pursuing internal balance 
as well as it can and that it is not restricting trade for balance-
of-payments reasons. In a growing world where the demand 
to hold reserves is therefore increasing over time, one needs to 
deduct the desired secular growth of reserve holdings in deter-
mining either the amount of capital outflow available from a 
current account surplus or the amount of foreign capital avail-
able to finance a current account deficit. 
Few countries now restrict trade for balance-of-payments 
reasons.  Similarly,  the  dominant  view  that  the  pressure  of 
demand drives the acceleration, rather than the level, of infla-
tion pretty much settles what is meant by internal balance. 
In contrast, the widespread advent of high capital mobility 
has made it far more difficult to pin down in any definitive 
way what is meant by a country’s “underlying capital flow.” 
An extreme view would be that an endogenous capital flow 
can finance any level of current account imbalance, making 
it impossible to define a FEER. We believe that this view 
goes altogether too far and that one can still identify danger-
ously large capital inflows (i.e., borrowing) and economically 
unproductive capital outflows (i.e., lending, including reserve 
buildups).  There  is  nevertheless  a  range  of  indeterminacy: 
Within  some  limits,  capital  flows  and  therefore  current 
accounts may vary without inducing forces that tend to curtail 
the flows. In this policy brief we adopt the position that limits 
lie at the edges of this range of indeterminacy and that it is 
desirable to work toward a situation in which these limits are 
respected. Naturally a FEER is defined in real (i.e., inflation-
adjusted) terms. If a country suffers 10 percent higher infla-
tion than its peers, then its currency will have to depreciate by 
10 percent in order to restore the same real position as before. 
Only then will its producers have their competitive position 
restored and will its consumers face the same choices as before. 
Similarly, the relevant exchange rate concept is an effec-
tive rate, i.e., one in which foreign currencies are taken into 
account  and  weighted  by  their  importance  in  the  foreign 
trade of the country in question to form a single estimate 
of the exchange rate. The practice of measuring a currency’s 
value  in  terms  of  the  currency  of  a  single  trading  partner 
and calling this “the exchange rate” is quite wrong for any 
country with reasonably diversified trade. This is a bilateral 
rate, in contrast to the effective rate, which gives a measure 
of a country’s overall competitive position. None of this is to N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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deny that competitiveness is also influenced by many other 
factors,  like  productivity,  which  are  implicitly  being  held 
constant in the analysis of exchange rates. While productivity 
may be enhanced by a “strong” currency policy, as advocates 
of such a policy assert (though with little empirical evidence 
to substantiate their case), we do not believe that productivity 
is stimulated so much that a country pursuing this policy can 
hope to emerge with a balance-of-payments position that is 
strengthened as a result of its policy.
The  above  discussion  assumes  that  one  is  seeking  the 
medium-run exchange rate that is in a country’s best interest. 
This seems to us to be one of the requirements for an exchange 
rate that the international community can reasonably require 
its constituent elements to accept. Another obvious require-
ment is that the set of exchange rates be mutually consistent. 
But the indeterminacy in defining a FEER suggests that there 
is an element of ambiguity in a FEER, which may be exploited 
to enable the international community to allow its members 
a degree of autonomy in selecting their objectives and thus 
their FEERs. In what follows we have tried to ask ourselves 
what the international community could reasonably ask of 
its constituent nations and to avoid asking for changes where 
they could not be justified as necessary in order to achieve 
mutual consistency.
AssumpTions
We  make  two  main  types  of  assumptions  in  estimating 
FEERs, in addition to those embodied in the models that we 
use (notably Cline’s SMIM). First, there are projections of 
what would occur if there were no changes in (real) exchange 
rates, which are based on the IMF’s latest WEO (April 2011), 
updated to take account of exchange rate changes between 
February  and  April  and  also  modified  to  take  account  of 
Cline’s larger estimate of the US deficit in 2016. Second, there 
are assumptions about the policy objectives that macroeco-
nomic policy should pursue.
We do not believe that it would be fruitful to attempt to 
estimate the equilibrium exchange rates of the currencies of 
the oil-exporting countries, represented in our set of major 
economies by Saudi Arabia, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela. 
These rates depend upon the countries’ saving strategies and 
the  oil  price.  Saving  strategies  vary  enormously  from  one 
country to another: Norway saves virtually all of an increment 
in the oil price, while Ecuador spends virtually everything 
and would face difficulties in the event of a protracted oil 
price decline. The world has to find a way to accommodate 
countries like Norway, since such a saving strategy reflects the 
transformation  of  natural,  exhaustible  resource  wealth  into 
wealth in the form of foreign assets. If exchange rate targeting 
came to be viewed as a way to cajole countries like Norway 
into acting contrary to their enlightened long-run interest and 
to force them into excessive adjustment, they would naturally 
be reluctant to participate. Sophisticated estimates of equilib-
rium exchange rates that avoided this danger would require 
knowledge and appraisal of the saving strategies of each oil 
exporter  identified  in  the  study.  That  would,  at  the  least, 
require detailed knowledge of each country that we do not 
claim to possess.
So far as the policy objectives that macroeconomic policy 
should  seek  are  concerned,  we  have  already  stated  that  we 
assume that all countries pursue internal balance. (Some coun-
tries—like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal today—may, however, 
be constrained by creditworthiness concerns.) The assumption 
is  that  they  do  this  by  manipulating  fiscal-monetary  policy 
appropriately, thus offsetting changes in internal demand that 
result from the pursuit of the external objective. This is not 
the same thing as ignoring internal balance and assuming the 
authorities are only interested in external balance, as is some-
times (wrongly) inferred. We also assume that countries should 
be pursuing some concept of external balance, but it is much 
more difficult to interpret what this means. We interpret it as 
implying a current account target: This target need not be zero; 
neither should it be so large as to lead a country into trouble in 
the long run. A customary interpretation of this view—which 
enjoys  some  modest  statistical  support2—is  that  countries 
should not run a current account deficit in excess of 3 percent 
of GDP on a sustained basis. A desire to have symmetrical rules 
on the surplus and deficit sides would then suggest extending 
this rule to surplus countries.
2. For emerging-market economies, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) 
identify 40 percent as a critical threshold for external debt relative to GDP, 
beyond which countries have tended to be vulnerable to default. External 
debt stabilizes at a debt-to-GDP ratio that equals the ratio of the current 
account deficit as a percent of GDP to the nominal growth rate of GDP in 
foreign currency. With emerging-market growth rates typically in the range of 
4 to 5 percent and world inflation at 2½ percent in dollars or euros, nominal 
GDP growth in foreign currency is typically on the order of 7 percent. Forty 
percent of this growth rate is about 3 percent, so the critical debt-to-GDP 
ratio translates into a current account deficit of about 3 percent of GDP. For 
industrial countries, Freund (2000) found that reversals of deficits tend to 
begin at a threshold of 5 percent of GDP and involve a slowdown in growth 
in the adjustment period. Mann (1999, 156) has identified 17 episodes in the 
1980s and 1990s when a widening of the current account deficit of industrial 
countries was reversed; the average ratio of the current account deficit to GDP 
was 4.5 percent when the reversal began (although she emphasized that the 
turning points were not necessarily the threshold of unsustainability). For 
the important case of the United States, Cline (2005, 172–74) argued that 3 
percent of GDP is a prudent long-term ceiling for the current account deficit 
despite the national advantage in the past of earning a higher return on foreign 
assets than it paid on liabilities, plus favorable valuation effects from exchange 
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We follow last year’s practice of limiting all countries to 
imbalances of at most 3 percent of GDP and eliminating the 
latitude that we previously gave to certain countries to run 
larger imbalances.3 The reasons for this change are twofold. 
First, the events in peripheral Europe have demonstrated the 
high price that countries may ultimately pay for running large 
and protracted deficits. Second, the current and prospectively 
protracted state of excess capacity in the advanced countries 
means that large current account surpluses impose a nega-
tive externality on others. We have not adopted the proposal, 
advanced  inter  alia  by  Edwin  Truman  (2010),  of  basing 
adjustment obligations on the prospective size of the current 
account imbalance as a percentage of “world GDP” (for which 
a better acronym is GWP, since there is no distinction between 
GDP and GNP at the world level).  Only fairly large countries 
are included in our group of 34, accounting for a combined 92 
percent of 2016 world product at market exchange rates.  We 
seek parity of treatment among them, rather than imposing 
an additional penalty on the largest among them through an 
additional layer of targets dependent on size.
The IMF estimate of Singapore’s current account surplus 
of 14.9 percent of GDP in 2016 is the largest of all the econo-
mies considered, although it is down from an even higher 20.4 
percent projected for 2011. Last year we questioned whether 
the  official  current  account  figures  had  been  exaggerated 
because cumulative reported surpluses exceeded the buildup 
in  net  foreign  assets  (NFA).  However,  new  official  data 
eliminate this paradox and show a discrepancy in the opposite 
direction, so the high current account seems more likely to 
be accurate and perhaps even understated.4 We have retained 
3. In 2008 we allowed deficits of 6 percent of GDP for commodity export-
ers Australia and New Zealand and surpluses of 6 percent for high-saving 
economies Switzerland and Singapore. For developing countries with surpluses 
below 3 percent of GDP we set targets of zero (Indonesia, Israel, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines) and symmetrically for advanced countries with deficits 
below 3 percent of GDP we also set targets of zero (Canada, the euro area, 
and Korea). In 2009 the only exceptions to the ±3 percent rule were for wider 
imbalances that would not cause the NFA/GDP ratio to rise (fall) further for 
net creditors (net debtors). In 2010 following the G-20 commitment to reduc-
ing global imbalances, we eliminated all exceptions to the ±3 percent rule. The 
only exception was Switzerland, which was allowed a larger measured surplus 
on the ground that accounting conventions result in an exaggeration of the 
real size of the Swiss surplus by an amount that we last year estimated at 4.1 
percent of GDP. We repeat the Swiss exception this year.
4. During 2010 the NFA figures reported by the IMF were increased sharply 
(for example, boosting the 2007 level from $155 billion to $359 billion). The 
new series indicate, for example, that whereas the cumulative current account 
surplus from 2002 through 2009 was $230 billion, the increase in net foreign 
assets was $374 billion (IMF 2011b). Note also that the negative balance 
on capital services despite a large NFA suggests that if anything, the current 
account surplus may be understated. In 2009, income on end-2008 foreign as-
sets of $1.13 trillion was $56 billion, a return of 5 percent, whereas payments 
on foreign liabilities of $790 billion were $57.5 billion, a return of 7.2 percent 
(IMF 2011b).
the IMF projection of the 2016 current account, which is 
in turn based on the official figures for the current account 
surplus, and thus identify the need for a large revaluation of 
the Singapore dollar.
Conversely,  the  largest  current  account  deficit  in  the 
WEO forecast is that of Turkey, at 8.4 percent of GDP in 
2016, about the same as the outcome in 2010. Last year the 
April WEO instead projected Turkey’s deficit at only 4 percent 
of GDP for 2010 and at a plateau of 4½ percent for 2011–15. 
This  year  essentially  the  plateau  has  shifted  downward  by 
4 percentage points of GDP, even though the real effective 
exchange rate has depreciated by 8 percent. Although growth 
in 2010 was unexpectedly strong (at 8.2 percent instead of 
5.2 percent as the April 2010 WEO had projected), for 2011 
and after the new projected growth path is not much different 
from last year’s projection. We suspect that, with little change 
in  the  medium-term  growth  path  and  some  exchange  rate 
correction already in the pipeline, this year’s WEO may be 
exaggerating Turkey’s  medium-term  current  account  deficit 
even though last year it underestimated it.
Table 1 (page 10) calculates the current account targets. 
The  first  column  (shown  purely  for  reference)  shows  the 
IMF’s (2011a) estimate of this year’s current account balance. 
Column 2 shows the Fund’s forecast of 2016 GDP in dollars 
at market exchange rates. Column 3 shows the IMF projec-
tion of the 2016 current account balance as a percentage of 
that  year’s  GDP.  Column  4  shows  our  adjusted  projection 
of the 2016 current account balance after taking account of 
changes in exchange rates from the IMF’s February base to 
our April base and Cline’s larger estimate of the US current 
account  deficit  (see  appendix  A)  and  the  overstatement  of 
the Swiss current account. Column 5 then shows the target 
current account imbalance. It is equal to a surplus or deficit of 
3 percent of GDP or the actual projected imbalance where it is 
less in absolute value than 3 percent of GDP. Fourteen of our 
30 non-oil economies have projected 2016 imbalances under 
3 percent of GDP and are therefore not called on to adjust 
their effective exchange rates.
As last time, the adding-up discrepancy caused by the 
world current account not summing to zero was automatically 
resolved by the SMIM model itself, instead of our making an 
ex ante adjustment. Solving the model in any event tends to 
generate modest discrepancies from the raw target changes.
Our methodology is most similar to the first of the three 
methods  employed  by  the  IMF’s  Consultative  Group  on 
Exchange Rate Issues to assess equilibrium exchange rates (Lee 
et al. 2008). Their macroeconomic balance approach differs 
in two important ways from our approach as described above. 
First, it uses an econometric rather than a judgmental approach N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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to determine current account targets. It is doubtless inevitable 
that the staff of an international organization will seek to use 
a  formula  rather  than  judgment  when  seeking  to  postulate 
national objectives, but that does not make it right. The objec-
tives thus postulated seem to make little normative sense (in 
that study, average current account targets were –1.9 percent of 
GDP for advanced countries outside Europe versus +1.3 percent 
of GDP for emerging Asia), as opposed to reflecting what actu-
ally happened (which the exercise is supposed to be aimed at 
preventing in future). Second, it uses estimated country-specific 
responses of the trade balance to the real exchange rate rather 
than using a formula for the response as the SMIM model does. 
This is undoubtedly preferable in principle, although the uncer-
tainties may not in practice give this method a big advantage. 
The second of the IMF’s approaches amounts to estimating 
a behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER). We regard this 
as appropriate only if it is plausible that on average the exchange 
rate was in equilibrium over the period of estimation.
The third of the IMF’s approaches aimed at stabilizing the 
NFA/GDP ratio at an appropriate level, which it interpreted 
as the level in 2006. This is not particularly appealing since 
there is no reason to think that NFA/GDP was in general at an 
optimal level in 2006, but the method has the virtue of ruling 
out Ponzi strategies. In 2009 we made use of this insight in 
our work, but this year we have maintained the decision of 
2010 not to allow countries greater scope to run imbalances if 
they had higher NFA/GDP ratios (negative or positive).
nATuRe of The model employed
Cline (2008) developed a symmetric matrix inversion method 
model  to  calculate  FEERs  for  34  economies.  This  method 
is symmetric in that it gives equal weight to each country in 
arriving at the realignment to FEERs, rather than (as in Cline 
2007)  requiring  exact  achievement  of  the  adjustment  target 
for the United States and then solving for partner exchange 
rate changes that would be both broadly consistent with this 
requirement  and  roughly  consistent  with  the  other  current 
account targets.
The model is based on two sets of relationships. The first 
is economic: The current account depends on the real effective 
exchange rate.5 The second is essentially algebraic: Any set of 
effective exchange rates has a direct mapping to a corresponding 
5. This relationship focuses on the relative price or “elasticity” effect in 
determination of trade. A parallel shadow “absorption” effect  must also be 
consistent, involving the national accounts identity whereby net imports equal 
investment minus saving (including public). Implicitly the focus on the effec-
tive exchange rate in external-sector adjustment assumes that parallel influ-
ences on domestic demand, such as a fiscal adjustment, take place to facilitate 
external adjustment and maintain the economy at full capacity.
set of bilateral exchange rates against the dollar, and there must 
be consistency not only between all of the desired changes in 
effective exchange rates but also between the resulting changes 
in all bilateral rates in a realignment to FEERs. 
The economic relationship states that the change in the 
current account as a percent of GDP will be equal to the 
percentage change in the effective exchange rate, multiplied 
by a country-specific impact parameter. The impact parameter 
(γ) equals the export price elasticity multiplied by the share of 
exports in GDP. As noted above, export elasticities in Lee et al. 
(2008) are specially tailored to each economy, thus being able 
in principle to reflect such factors as idiosyncrasies of greater 
or lesser exchange rate responsiveness (including, for example, 
influences of product composition as well as exchange rate 
pass through) of the economy’s principal trading partners. In 
our work, however, the export price elasticity is assumed to 
follow a standard formula set at unity for a relatively closed 
economy with exports amounting to 10 percent of GDP, and 
falling to 0.5 (because of increasing supply constraints) for 
a highly open economy, with exports equal to 100 percent 
of GDP or more. Estimates of the impact parameter were 
updated as noted in appendix table B.1 (page 18) to reflect 
2010 ratios of trade/GDP.
The overall effect is that the impact parameter varies from 
about a 0.15 percent of GDP change in the current account 
for each percentage point change in the effective exchange 
rate for a relatively closed economy to a maximum of a 0.5 
percent of GDP change per percentage point change in the 
effective exchange rate for a highly open economy. In the case 
of China, for example, we estimate an impact parameter of a 
0.3 percent of GDP reduction in the current account surplus 
for  a  1  percentage  point  appreciation  in  the  real  effective 
exchange rate. If the target external adjustment is a reduction 
in the current account surplus by 6 percent of GDP, the target 
effective exchange rate appreciation will need to be 6/(0.3) = 
20 percent.
The identification of the target change in each country’s 
REER is thus simple. For each country, the change equals the 
desired change in the current account as a percent of GDP 
divided by the elasticity-based impact parameter. The problem 
then becomes more complicated, however, when consistency 
is imposed on all of the resulting changes in REERs. Changing 
the REER for any given country necessarily changes those of 
its trading partners.
This, then, involves a set of algebraic relationships among 
individual economies’ effective exchange rates and between 
bilateral and multilateral effective exchange rate changes. If 
a currency appreciates by, say, 10 percent against the dollar 
in isolation, its effective appreciation against all trading part-N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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ners also equals the bilateral appreciation, or 10 percent. But 
if other trading partners also appreciate, the home country’s 
appreciation  in  effective  terms  will  be  diminished  by  an 
amount that depends on the importance of the other appre-
ciating countries as trading partners. This influence turns out 
to be particularly important when considering possible correc-
tive changes in exchange rates in East Asia. Bilaterally against 
the dollar, some of the indicated changes may be quite large, 
but because several regional trading partners also show sizable 
bilateral  appreciations  against  the  dollar  in  order  to  reach 
adjustment targets, the corresponding effective exchange rate 
changes are considerably smaller.
The SMIM model solves for a set of bilateral exchange 
rate changes against the dollar (zi, for country i) that is consis-
tent with a target set of changes in effective exchange rates 
(ri). It turns out that this solution is the answer to a matrix 
algebra problem, in which the bilateral exchange rate changes 
(in percent), the effective exchange rate changes (in percent), 
and a matrix of trade weights enter in the equation.6 It also 
turns out that there is not one single solution to this problem. 
With  35  economies,  the  number  considered  in  this  study 
(counting the rest of the world as an economy), there are 35 
possible alternative solutions. The reason is that there are 35 
equations for target effective exchange rate changes (one for 
each country, in light of its target current account change 
and impact parameter) but only 34 unknown exchange rate 
changes against the dollar, because the dollar cannot change 
against itself (in the jargon of the exchange rate literature, it 
is the numeraire). Our approach to dealing with this problem 
of  “overdetermination”  is  simply  to  average  the  alternative 
possible sets of exchange rate changes.7
6. Namely: Z = B-1R, where Z is a vector of bilateral exchange rate changes 
against the dollar (percentages), R is a vector of effective exchange rate changes 
(percentages), and B = I – A where B is the matrix obtained by subtracting the 
trade-weights matrix A from the identity matrix I.
7. There is a single exception, for each country. Of the 35 solutions, the 
average for the currency in question is that of the 34 equations in which the 
country has been included. The remaining equation omits the direct effective 
rate equation for the country and only obtains the country’s bilateral exchange 
rate change indirectly as needed to generate the set of effective exchange rate 
changes sought for the other countries. The average of the 34 results with 
Own Country Included, or 34OCI, is used as the estimate of the bilateral ex-
change rate change for the country in question, because the one Own Country 
Excluded (OCE) result systematically turns out to be unrepresentative. The 
OCE estimate is always lower than the 34OCI average, in some cases absurdly 
so. With the 34OCI estimates in hand for each of 35 economies’ exchange 
rate change against the dollar (except for the dollar itself, which is zero), the 
corresponding set of effective exchange rate changes is then calculated. Because 
of the overdetermination problem, this estimated consistent set shows diver-
gences from the target set of effective exchange rate changes. These divergences 
are generally small, however. 
ResulTs
The  results  of  our  calculations  are  shown  in  table  2  (page 
11). The first column shows the target change in the current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP and is simply the 
difference between columns 5 and 4 in table 1. The adjacent 
column shows how close the simulations of the model came 
to achieving the targets laid out. It can be seen that simulated 
changes in current account balances are larger (in algebraic 
value) than the targets, by an average amount of slightly over 
0.4 percent (and varying from 0.1 to 1.1 percent). This reflects 
the fact that the SMIM model was told to resolve a substantial 
world discrepancy in the summing up of the desired current 
account changes.
Column 3 shows our estimates of the target changes in 
effective exchange rates in April 2011, derived from the target 
changes in the current account in 2016 (column 1) and the 
impact  parameters  (table  B.1).  Column  4  shows  the  corre-
sponding model estimates of changes in the effective exchange 
rates, which approximates each country’s target as closely as 
possible while ensuring consistency across countries. A posi-
tive number indicates that the currency of the area in question 
needed to appreciate because it was undervalued, and conversely. 
The  fact  that  countries  that  were  not  named  as  needing  to 
adjust nevertheless have negative numbers, indicating a need 
for depreciation, reflects the fact that the model is seeking to 
impose larger improvements than those called for in column 1 
of table 2 in order to obtain adding-up consistency.
The results are largely as one might have expected. The 
countries that need to seek weaker effective rates are those with 
large  current  account  deficits:  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
South Africa, Turkey, (marginally) Poland and Hungary, and 
the United States and Brazil. These are countries with floating 
exchange rates that have been pushed to an overvalued level 
by (in most cases) capital mobility and the carry trade, rein-
forced in the case of the United States by the dollar’s role as 
the currency to which many other countries peg combined 
with the decision of some other countries to peg their rates at 
an undervalued level. The countries that need to revalue their 
effective rates are primarily Asian: China and countries that 
make it a priority to avoid losing competitiveness versus China 
(Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan). Also labeled 
as undervalued are two countries with floating exchange rates: 
Sweden and Switzerland.
Column 5 shows the actual average dollar exchange rates 
over April 2011. Column 6 presents the results of applying 
Cline’s  SMIM  model  to  estimate  the  percentage  changes 
needed  in  the  dollar  exchange  rates  (these  changes  in  the 
bilateral rate against the dollar also yield the changes in effec-N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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tive exchange rates shown in column 4). The results indicate 
that New Zealand, South Africa, and Turkey are much more 
overvalued than the dollar and therefore need to depreciate 
strongly against it, while Australia and Brazil8 are somewhat 
overvalued bilaterally against the dollar. Other currencies that 
are overvalued on an effective basis, like the Polish zloty and 
the Hungarian forint, do not need to depreciate against the 
dollar. All of these results are strongly influenced by the fact 
that the dollar needs a larger depreciation this year than last 
owing to the less favorable US current account outlook. 
The last column in table 2 shows our estimate of the 
FEER-consistent dollar exchange rate, but for other than the 
nationals of each country the previous column is probably 
more significant. This column (6) shows the percentage change 
in the bilateral exchange rate needed to achieve the position 
listed in column 7. Most currencies are shown as needing 
appreciation against the dollar. The appreciation against the 
dollar is shown as large in Asia, where the renminbi influence 
is important; about 5 percent in Europe, where the euro is key 
(but with larger appreciations for Sweden and Switzerland); 
and negligible in the Western Hemisphere, where the dollar 
still dominates. The undervaluation of the renminbi is shown 
as somewhat greater this year than last, while the undervalua-
tion of the euro in terms of the dollar is strictly a result of the 
appreciation that would be needed to prevent a depreciation 
of its effective rate in the event of a renminbi appreciation. 
Of course, the Chinese figure probably exaggerates the size of 
the surplus to be expected in China in 2016 because of the 
IMF’s (and our) technical assumption that exchange rates will 
henceforth be unchanged.
China and the United States remain at the center of the 
global  imbalances  problem.  Of  the  total  reduction  in  2016 
surpluses among excess-surplus countries, China accounts for 
76 percent (about $540 billion). Taiwan and Singapore are in 
distant second and third places (at about $40 billion each). 
The mirror image is a concentration of adjustment magnitudes 
8. We continue to believe that the IMF is underestimating the long-run dam-
age to Brazil’s trading position from the strong real, but we are seeking to draw 
out the implications of the IMF’s forecasts and not to second-guess them.
among excess-deficit countries, with the United States by far 
the largest correction (45 percent of the total for deficit reduc-
tions, or about $340 billion), followed at considerable distance 
by Turkey, Australia, and Brazil (each in the range of about $45 
billion to $65 billion).
In previous years we compared the new results of the FEER-
consistent dollar rates (after adjustment for inflation) with those 
of the previous year. This year we extend those comparisons in 
two ways. First, we compare the results for the consistency of 
FEERs (defined in REER terms) over time, as well as those for 
FEER-consistent dollar rates. Second, we make a comparison 
over the four years for which we have been undertaking the 
calculations, rather than just the most recent pair.
Table 3 (page 12) displays the FEERs over the four years, 
in each case taking the 2008 FEER = 100. A bigger number 
denotes an appreciation, so that a number greater than 100 
means that the FEER estimated in that year was stronger than 
the 2008 FEER. Using 2008 FEER = 100 as base, the range of 
our estimates averages 15.1 and reaches a maximum of 28.1 in 
the case of South Africa. 
Table 4 (page 13) displays the FEER-consistent dollar 
rates over the same four years, using the 2008 FEER-consistent 
rate as 100. It can be seen that New Zealand shows the most 
variation, of no less than 46.3. In general the variation in the 
FEER-consistent dollar rates is greater than that of the corre-
sponding FEERs, averaging 20.9, but this is not universally 
true (e.g., Argentina and China). The obvious explanation is 
that FEER-consistent dollar rates depend also on the variation 
of the dollar’s FEER  as well as on that of the country’s FEER.
In view of the decision of the G-20 to conduct a mutual 
assessment program (MAP) with the objective of curtailing 
global imbalances, particular interest attaches to our results 
for the G-20 countries. These are shown in table 5 (page 14).9 
Looking first at the FEERs, it can be seen that 9 of the 15 
currencies are shown as within 3 percent of equilibrium. Only 
one (the renminbi) is shown as undervalued. The Turkish lira 
is by far the most overvalued currency, followed by the South 
African rand, the Australian dollar, the Brazilian real, and the 
US dollar. Interestingly, only two of those countries, namely 
China and the United States, are among the seven that have 
been selected by the G-20 for intensive investigation because 
9. Table 5 expresses the first three columns as index numbers with the FEER 
for February 2008 as the base, 100. Thus, for example, using this base the 
actual REER for Argentina stood at 103.9 in February 2008, but had fallen 
to 92.3 by April 2011. Nevertheless, the REER remained slightly overvalued 
against the April 2011 FEER of 89.9 (again on an index with the 2008 
FEER at 100.) Note further that specifying the misalignment in table 5 as 
percent overvaluation yields a slightly different figure from the corresponding 
“percentage change”’ in the next to last column of table 2. For example, for 
China the 28.5 percent appreciation shown in table 2 corresponds to the 
misalignment of –22.2 percent reported in table 5.
All of these results are strongly influenced 
by the fact that the dollar needs a 
larger depreciation this year than last 
owing to the less favorable US 
current account outlook. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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of the size of the spillovers from their national actions onto 
other countries. The actions of the other five selected (France, 
Germany, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom) may impact 
other countries, but the conduct of their exchange rate policy 
gives no obvious ground for complaint.
Let us next consider the FEER-consistent dollar rates, 
shown in the right-hand three columns of table 5. This shows 
a radically different picture. It is true that China is still the 
only radically undervalued currency and the Turkish lira is still 
by far the most overvalued with the South African rand next, 
but even the Australian dollar and the Brazilian real are close 
to equilibrium against the US dollar. Meanwhile the table 
emphasizes that if there is to be a realignment of exchange 
rates adequate to accomplish global rebalancing, then a whole 
slew of currencies—the euro, the Indian rupee, the Indonesian 
rupiah, the Japanese yen, the Korean won, the Mexican peso, 
and the pound sterling—which are in overall equilibrium, will 
have to accept revaluations against the dollar.
China connoisseurs will doubtless note that our calcu-
lations show the need for a slightly larger effective revalua-
tion of the renminbi this year (17.6 percent) than last (15.3 
percent) and a larger appreciation of the renminbi in terms 
of the dollar (28.5 percent rather than 24.2 percent), despite 
the intervening appreciation of the renminbi. We would make 
two  observations.  First,  the  renminbi  has  not  appreciated 
in effective terms between the two periods: Almost all other 
countries have appreciated more against the dollar than China 
has. Deflating by consumer prices and applying the SMIM 
model trade weights, the real effective exchange rate of the 
renminbi was virtually unchanged from May 2010 to April 
2011.10 Second, the change in the objective in terms of the 
dollar (a target rate of 5.09 renminbi per dollar rather than 
5.50)  reflects  primarily  the  reduction  in  the  FEER  of  the 
dollar (by 10 percent) rather than an increase in that of the 
renminbi (by 2.6 percent; see table 3). 
10. With 2007 = 100, the REER index for the renminbi was at 113.2 in May 
2010 and 113.6 in April 2011. The BIS real effective exchange rate index actu-
ally shows a depreciation rather than appreciation for the renminbi, from an 
index of 119.96 in May 2010 to 116.92 in April 2011 (BIS 2011).
One of the purposes of estimating FEERs was to gauge 
the feasibility of a program of limited exchange rate flexibility. 
If estimated FEERs display constancy over time, that would 
suggest the feasibility of specifying a central rate and defending 
it against market skepticism. If the estimates jump around 
capriciously from one year to another, that tends to make 
one doubtful of the feasibility of this program. The results 
displayed in table 3 are not particularly encouraging. Had one 
used the FEERs estimated in 2008 as base, only 10 of the 
30 currencies remained within the traditional +/–10 percent 
limit for each of the following three years. By enlarging the 
permitted range to +/–15 percent, one captures 20 of the 30 
currencies, with a further four only marginally outside. But 
that leaves six currencies—those of Australia, Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, South Africa, and Turkey—in which the varia-
tions of the estimated FEERs have been embarrassingly large. 
It is possible that some of the changes in FEERs resulted from 
real changes that would have been recognized and incorporated 
(since the FEER is not supposed to be a constant), but there is 
no obvious way of testing this conjecture. In the case of one of 
the most extreme changes in the FEER, the 25 percent drop 
for Turkey from 2008 to 2011, as noted above, it may be that 
the IMF’s new baseline projection exaggerates the prospective 
current account deficit, resulting in an exaggerated reduction 
in our calculated FEER.
Despite these exceptions, the most important economies 
generally do show FEER variation that remains within a ±15 
percent band. The world’s six largest economies all do so (the 
United States, euro area, China, Japan, Brazil, and the United 
Kingdom). For the 34 economies combined, 93 percent of 
2016 GDP is in economies whose currencies stay within (or 
almost within) a 15 percent band (table 3).
ConClusion
In April 2011 most currencies appear to have been reason-
ably close to their FEERs. The most important exceptions are 
China, on the weak side, and the United States, on the strong 
side. The two are likely to be closely related: China pegs its 
exchange rate at an undervalued level and then feeds a substan-
tial share of the resulting proceeds into the United States, thus 
pushing up the dollar for portfolio reasons in terms of other 
floating currencies. This suggests the really important change 
remains, as we have argued ever since the first of our annual 
publication of FEERs, to persuade the Chinese authorities 
that they too would benefit from a more realistic value of the 
renminbi. (Our analysis has demonstrated yet again that a 
revaluation by China should be accompanied by similar moves 
by a number of East Asian currencies.)
Our calculations show the need for a 
slightly larger effective revaluation of the 
renminbi this year (17.6 percent) than last 
(15.3 percent) and a larger appreciation 
of the renminbi in terms of the dollar….N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Note that there is no contradiction between this view 
and the widely accepted view that elimination of the global 
imbalances requires an expansion in Chinese demand and an 
increase in the American saving rate. In the absence of comple-
mentary  moves  focusing  on  changing  demand,  one  would 
have to expect that moves of exchange rates to their FEERs 
would be reversed by relative inflation. The two changes are 
complements,  not  substitutes.  It  is  of  course  possible  that 
China will instead adjust by pushing up nominal wages, but 
the Chinese share a strong aversion to inflation, which gives 
them  an  interest  in  making  the  adjustment  in  real  prices 
largely through an exchange rate appreciation. Now would 
thus be a favorable time for renminbi appreciation for both 
China, helping in its fight against inflation, and the United 
States, helping in its fight against unemployment. 
We have also found that several currencies are significantly 
stronger than their FEERs (Turkey, South Africa, Australia, 
and New Zealand). While no one can know the exact time 
when they will face a crisis, and it is possible that they still 
have unused latitude to add to their debt, it is to be hoped 
that they will resist the temptation to argue that “this time it is 
different.” By now we know what that is a prelude to.
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Table 1     Target current accounts for 2016
Country
IMF projection 
of 2011 current 
account
(percent of GDP)
IMF 2016 GDP 
forecast













Australia –0.4 1,697 –6.2 –5.6 –3.0
New Zealand –0.2 181 –7.0 –7.4 –3.0
Asia
China 5.7 11,220 7.8 8.3 3.0
Hong Kong 5.2 342 7.9 9.8 3.0
India –3.7 2,777 –1.6 –1.6 –1.6
Indonesia 0.9 1,337 –1.0 –1.0 –1.0
Japan 2.3 6,540 2.0 2.8 2.8
Korea 1.1 1,586 0.6 0.1 0.1
Malaysia 11.4 362 8.6 10.1 3.0
Philippines 2.9 289 0.9 1.6 1.6
Singapore 20.4 319 14.9 16.1 3.0
Taiwan 11.6 751 8.0 9.3 3.0
Thailand 2.7 498 2.0 2.2 2.2
Middle East/Africa
Israel 3.3 308 3.4 3.1 3.0
Saudi Arabia 19.8 772 6.2 7.4 7.4
South Africa –4.4 501 –6.0 –6.7 –3.0
Europe
Czech Republic –1.8 336 –0.7 –0.4 –0.4
Euro area 0.0 14,804 0.1 –0.5 –0.5
Hungary 1.5 172 –3.7 –5.4 –3.0
Norway 16.3 544 14.8 14.6 14.6
Poland –3.9 688 –4.3 –4.2 –3.0
Russia 5.6 3,237 0.3 0.5 0.5
Sweden 6.1 721 5.6 6.2 3.0
Switzerland 13.2 635 12.0 8.1 3.0
Turkey –8.0 1,159 –8.4 –8.5 –3.0
United Kingdom –2.4 3,220 –1.0 –0.0 –0.0
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0.1 709 –0.9 –0.3 –0.3
Brazil –2.6 3,303 –3.6 –4.0 –3.0
Canada –2.8 2,063 –1.3 0.4 0.4
Chile 0.5 298 –2.5 –1.6 –1.6
Colombia –2.1 409 –1.8 –1.8 –1.8
Mexico –0.9 1,495 –1.5 –0.0 –0.0
United States –3.2 18,808 –3.4 –4.3 –3.0
Venezuela 7.0 327 2.0 2.8 2.8
Source: IMF (2011a); authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Table 2     Results of the simulation
Changes in current account 
















Australiaa 2.6 3.1 –12.4 –14.9 1.05 –3.2 1.02
New Zealanda 4.4 4.9 –16.3 –18.2 0.78 –10.7 0.70
Asia
China –5.3 –4.8 17.6 16.0 6.54 28.5 5.09
Hong Kong –6.8 –6.3 13.7 12.5 7.77 31.4 5.92
India 0.0 0.4 0.0 –1.7 44.4 8.2 41.0
Indonesia 0.0 0.4 0.0 –1.8 8,660 14.6 7,554
Japan 0.0 0.3 0.0 –1.8 84 10.4 76
Korea 0.0 0.7 0.0 –1.6 1,087 11.0 979
Malaysia –7.1 –6.2 14.2 12.4 3.02 28.7 2.35
Philippines 0.0 0.5 0.0 –1.5 43.2 13.1 38.2
Singapore –13.1 –12.0 26.2 24.1 1.25 38.5 0.90
Taiwan –6.3 –5.7 14.1 12.7 29.0 27.5 22.8
Thailand 0.0 0.8 0.0 –1.8 30.1 11.7 27.0
Middle East/Africa
Israel –0.1 0.3 0.4 –0.9 3.44 4.5 3.29
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.6 0.0 –1.4 3.75 7.8 3.48
South Africa 3.7 4.1 –14.8 –16.2 6.75 –8.7 7.38
Europe
Czech Republic 0.0 0.5 0.0 –1.0 16.9 3.9 16.3
Euro areaa 0.0 0.5 0.0 –2.3 1.44 4.5 1.50
Hungary 2.4 2.9 –4.9 –5.9 185 –0.3 185
Norway 0.0 0.4 0.0 –1.1 5.43 4.9 5.18
Poland 1.2 1.6 –3.6 –4.8 2.77 0.3 2.76
Russia 0.0 0.3 0.0 –1.2 28.2 4.5 27.0
Sweden –3.2 –2.7 8.5 7.2 6.24 12.2 5.56
Switzerland –5.1 –4.7 11.4 10.5 0.90 15.4 0.78
Turkey 5.5 5.7 –28.0 –29.1 1.52 –23.1 1.98
United Kingdoma 0.0 0.3 0.0 –1.3 1.63 4.5 1.71
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0.0 0.5 0.0 –2.7 4.06 1.4 4.00
Brazil 1.0 1.4 –7.5 –10.1 1.59 –3.9 1.65
Canada 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0.6 0.96 1.9 0.94
Chile 0.0 0.7 0.0 –2.1 472 4.0 454
Colombia 0.0 0.3 0.0 –2.1 1,815 1.7 1,784
Mexico 0.0 0.2 0.0 –0.7 11.8 1.5 11.6
United States 1.3 1.8 –6.2 –8.5 1.00 0.0 1.00
Venezuela 0.0 0.4 0.0 –1.6 4.29 1.9 4.21
FEER = fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
REER = real effective exchange rate
a. The currencies of these countries are expressed as dollars per currency. All other currencies are expressed as currency per dollar. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Table 3      FEER estimated over the last four years (2008 = 100)
Country
 February  
2008  March 2009  May 2010  April 2011 Range
Pacific
Australia 100 73.7 85.6 97.0 26.3
New Zealand 100 83.2 73.2 82.5 26.8
Asia
China 100 114.5 101.4 104.0 14.5
Hong Kong 100 98.1 100.5 99.9 2.4
India 100 93.1 115.0 115.6 22.5
Indonesia 100 88.1 104.8 105.7 17.6
Japan 100 112.6 106.8 106.7 12.6
Korea 100 73.6 86.6 87.8 26.4
Malaysia 100 102.6 102.1 101.6 2.6
Philippines 100 93.3 95.0 94.8 6.7
Singapore 100 91.7 111.3 109.3 19.6
Taiwan 100 99.9 97.0 101.2 4.1
Thailand 100 95.3 98.4 97.9 4.7
Middle East/Africa
Israel 100 93.6 100.0 104.5 10.9
South Africa 100 95.8 119.8 123.9 28.1
Europe
Czech Republic 100 97.3 96.9 101.4 4.5
Euro area 100 112.7 98.5 101.6 14.2
Hungary 100 94.4 103.4 104.3 9.8
Poland 100 86.8 97.5 97.6 13.2
Sweden 100 89.8 93.6 101.6 11.8
Switzerland 100 98.4 98.7 106.6 8.2
Turkey 100 99.2 101.5 74.8 26.7
United Kingdom 100 88.5 91.3 91.7 11.5
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 100 110.5 98.4 89.9 20.7
Brazil 100 86.9 105.9 110.1 23.2
Canada 100 88.0 101.6 108.1 20.1
Chile 100 86.6 92.9 97.3 13.4
Colombia 100 94.8 113.9 116.1 21.2
Mexico 100 80.6 92.5 99.4 19.4
United States 100 104.3 106.0 95.5 10.5
Source: Authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Table 4     FEER-consistent dollar rates estimated over the last four years  
  (2008 prices, 2008=100)
Country
 February  
2008
 March 
2009  May 2010  April 2011 Range
Pacific
Australiaa 100 137.5 120.8 96.3 41.3
New Zealanda 100 133.9 146.3 117.5 46.3
Asia
China 100 88.9 100.5 91.2 11.6
Hong Kong 100 99.5 103.8 95.9 7.9
India 100 110.6 92.9 81.8 28.8
Indonesia 100 119.6 97.3 88.5 31.2
Japan 100 91.4 97.4 89.3 10.7
Korea 100 135.0 119.7 108.3 35.0
Malaysia 100 103.3 100.1 92.9 10.4
Philippines 100 108.9 108.7 99.6 9.3
Singapore 100 113.0 94.5 87.7 25.3
Taiwan 100 102.0 106.8 93.4 13.5
Thailand 100 106.5 104.1 94.4 12.1
Middle East/Africa
Israel 100 108.0 105.2 93.8 14.3
South Africa 100 105.4 90.5 77.8 27.6
Europe
Czech Republic 100 103.4 115.3 95.7 19.6
Euro areaa 100 95.1 111.5 97.3 16.4
Hungary 100 106.3 108.0 92.2 15.8
Poland 100 115.3 114.6 100.2 15.3
Sweden 100 114.6 119.1 97.2 21.8
Switzerland 100 102.4 111.4 90.8 20.6
Turkey 100 102.0 107.6 122.2 22.2
United Kingdoma 100 116.6 121.6 107.2 21.6
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 100 96.9 107.8 103.9 10.9
Brazil 100 115.8 100.5 88.4 27.4
Canada 100 114.0 99.9 91.7 22.2
Chile 100 119.7 114.4 100.0 19.7
Colombia 100 107.1 93.1 84.1 23.0
Mexico 100 124.5 110.2 99.2 25.3
a. The currencies of these countries are expressed as dollars per currency. All other currencies are expressed as currency 
per dollar. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Argentina 103.9 92.3 89.9 2.7 4.06 4.00 –1.5
Australiaa 101.3 114.0 97.0 17.5 1.05 1.02 2.9
Brazil 101.4 122.6 110.1 11.4 1.59 1.65 3.8
Canada 104.3 108.7 108.1 0.6 0.960 0.942 –1.9
China 84.5 89.7 104.0 –13.8 6.54 5.09 –22.2
Euro areaa 107.8 104.0 101.6 2.4 1.44 1.50 –4.0
India 103.8 117.5 115.6 1.6 44.4 41.0 –7.7
Indonesia 96.6 107.6 105.7 1.8 8,660 7554 –12.8
Japan 94.6 108.7 106.7 1.9 83.6 75.8 –9.3
Korea 103.6 89.2 87.8 1.6 1,087 979 –9.9
Mexico 100.4 100.1 99.4 0.7 11.8 11.6 –1.7
South Africa 117.1 147.9 123.9 19.4 6.75 7.38 9.3
Turkey 114.9 105.5 74.8 41.0 1.52 1.98 30.3
United Kingdoma 107.1 92.9 91.7 1.3 1.63 1.71 –4.7
United States 109.4 104.5 95.5 9.4 1.00 1.00
FEER = fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
REER = real effective exchange rate
a. The currencies of these countries are expressed as dollars per currency. All other currencies are expressed as currency per dollar. 
b. Percentage by which REER exceeds FEER in April 2011
c. Percentage by which market rate exceeds FEER-consistent rate in April 2011
Source: Authors’ calculations. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Appendix A BAseline pRojeCTions foR The 
uniTed sTATes And ChinA
uniTed sTATes
In successive annual issues of our estimates of FEERs, on some 
occasions we have adopted the IMF’s WEO baseline projection 
of the US current account, and other times we have replaced 
it with projections from the US-specific models maintained 
by Cline (2005 and subsequent revisions), depending on the 
size of the difference from the WEO projection. Cline (2011a) 
updates  the  parameters  of  the  KGS  (Krugman-Gagnon-
symmetrical) model. When the updated model is applied to the 
April 2011 WEO projections of country growth rates and oil 
prices, and using the April 2011 level of the Federal Reserve’s 
broad real exchange rate (Federal Reserve 2011), the result is a 
moderately larger medium-term deficit than projected by the 
IMF. By 2016, the US current account deficit stands at 4.3 
percent of GDP (Cline 2011b) rather than the 3.4 percent 
projected by the IMF. The difference would be even wider, by 
about 0.4 percent of GDP, using the IMF’s April 2011 WEO 
base period of February 8–March 8 for exchange rates rather 
than April exchange rates, given the decline of the dollar by 
about 2½ percent from February to April. 
Private-sector forecasts tend to support a somewhat larger 
current  account  deficit  than  projected  by  the  IMF.  Thus, 
Macroeconomic Advisers (2011) projects the 2011 deficit at 
3.8 percent of GDP, the same as Cline (2011b), and Consensus 
Economics (2011), 3.6 percent of GDP, whereas the WEO 
estimate for this year is only 3.2 percent. Although it is unclear 
what  divergences  might  cause  the  IMF  baseline  to  show  a 
substantially smaller deficit by 2016 than that in the KGSR 
model baseline (with R for “revised”), it warrants mention that 
an important influence in the latter is the sizable reduction in 
the capital services surplus (from 1.2 percent of GDP in both 
2010 and 2011 to only 0.3 percent by 2016). This erosion 
reflects the return of interest rates toward more normal levels 
(from 3.2 percent in 2010 to 5.3 percent by 2016, based on 
Congressional Budget Office [CBO 2011] projections). 
An  important  question  is  why  the  US  medium-term 
external deficit has returned to being meaningfully in excess 
of our 3 percent ceiling for fundamental equilibrium whereas 
our previous estimate in November 2010 judged the dollar 
approximately at equilibrium, despite the fact that the dollar 
has declined further in the interim. Thus, in June 2010 we 
estimated that the dollar needed to decline from its May base 
by 7.8 percent in effective terms to bring the medium-term 
current account deficit down to a target of 3 percent of GDP; 
by October the effective rate had fallen by 5.3 percent, leaving 
so small a remaining gap (2.5 percent) that we interpreted 
the dollar to have reached approximate equilibrium (Cline 
and Williamson 2010b, table 1). From October to April the 
real effective exchange rate of the dollar fell an additional 3.4 
percent (Federal Reserve 2011). The dollar would thus now 
be slightly below its FEER if the economic environment had 
not changed.
Instead, two main changes have occurred since last year 
that have eroded the medium-term US current account baseline. 
First, oil prices have increased. Last year our projection placed 
the average for Brent and West Texas Intermediate at $84 per 
barrel in 2011 and $106 in 2015; the new projection (Cline 
2011b) applies the 2011 April WEO forecast of $107 in 2011 
and $113 in 2015. The extra cost of oil imports amounts to 1 
percent of GDP in 2011 and 0.5 percent by 2015. Second, the 
foreign growth outlook and hence the market for US exports 
has weakened. Weighting by US exports, the IMF’s WEO has 
reduced projected foreign growth from the April 2010 edition 
to the April 2011 edition by an average of 0.2 percent annu-
ally for 2011–15. In addition to these two economic factors, the 
addition of one year to the horizon of the baseline (2016 rather 
than 2015) is not favorable to the US outlook because of the 
rising influence of interest payable on external debt as the US 
interest rate returns to more normal levels. Thus, in the most 
recent US baseline the current account deficit widens from 4.0 
percent of GDP in 2015 to 4.3 percent in 2016, and two-thirds 
of the 0.3 percentage point erosion is attributable to a decline in 
the balance on capital services income. Unlike most other major 
countries, the United States is already beyond the 3 percent of 
GDP allowable limit for the current account deficit and therefore 
has to adjust its exchange rate in response to these influences.
Finally, an important question about the US baseline is 
how it should be seen in relationship to the problem of high 
fiscal  deficits.  In  general,  the  FEERs  analysis  assumes  that 
countries manage their fiscal affairs so as to maintain internal 
balance, namely, a balanced combination of modest inflation 
and  moderately  low  unemployment.  When  a  need  for  an 
effective depreciation (or appreciation) is calculated in order 
to reach the FEER, the implicit assumption is that the depre-
ciating (appreciating) country will accompany the movement 
in the exchange rate with appropriate fiscal tightening (loos-
ening) so as to maintain internal balance. Indeed, the fiscal 
adjustment is a classic proximate mechanism to implement 
the  exchange  rate  adjustment,  because  tighter  fiscal  policy 
should reduce the interest rate and hence tend to lower the 
exchange rate, whereas fiscal loosening should do the reverse.
The  analysis  is  complicated,  however,  by  the  fact  that 
the United States starts from a point of internal imbalance: 
Unemployment is too high. If there were no concern about 
excessive  public  debt,  there  would  be  little  case  for  fiscal N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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tightening until relatively full employment had returned and 
conceivably a case for further fiscal expansion to reduce unem-
ployment. The normal full-employment relationship between 
a larger fiscal deficit and a larger current account deficit would 
not obtain, because the larger fiscal deficit would not impose 
a withdrawal of resources from exports for use in providing 
the supply for increased domestic consumption. Rather, the 
extra  resources  needed  would  be  obtained  from  additional 
production provided by increased utilization of the stock of 
unemployed workers and idle plant capacity. 
The baseline projection by the CBO (2011) shows US 
unemployment  falling  from  9.6  percent  in  2010  to  9.4 
percent in 2011, 8.4 percent in 2012, 7.6 percent in 2013, 
6.8 percent in 2014, 5.9 percent in 2015, and 5.3 percent in 
2016, where it plateaus for subsequent years. Through almost 
all of the five-year horizon, then, the economy is expected to 
be operating below full capacity. The WEO projects a gradual 
decline of the “output gap” from its 2009 peak at 6 percent 
of GDP and a level of 4.8 percent in 2010 and 3.7 percent in 
2011 to a gap of 2.0 percent by 2013, 0.9 percent by 2015, 
and 0.4 percent by 2016. As for the fiscal deficit, if current 
legislation is not changed and the Bush era tax cuts expire the 
deficit should decline from 9.8 percent of GDP in 2011 to 
3.1 percent by 2014, but if the tax cuts are made permanent 
and the usual annual “fixes” for the alternative minimum tax 
and Medicare physician reimbursement are pursued the deficit 
would remain as high as 6 percent of GDP in 2013–15 and 6.8 
percent by 2016 (CBO 2011). Overall, there is little prospect 
of a further widening of the fiscal deficit, and there is excess 
capacity through most of the period, so it seems unlikely that 
the already sizable current account deficit projected in Cline 
(2011b),  or  4.3  percent  of  GDP  by  2016,  is  understated 
because of the general influence of a still high fiscal deficit. 
ChinA
In contrast to the United States, for China independent alter-
native projections might arguably show a narrower rather than 
wider current account imbalance than projected by the IMF. 
Nonetheless, we have adopted the IMF projections, for two 
main reasons. First, as shown in Cline (2010), after taking 
account of the exchange rate and domestic growth relative 
to foreign growth, there is a secular upward trend in China’s 
current account surplus that amounts to about 0.8 percent of 
GDP per year. Such a trend is consistent with Nicholas Lardy’s 
diagnosis of rapid relative productivity gains (Goldstein and 
Lardy 2008, 24). So even if the IMF’s projection of China’s 
surplus  is  overstated  for  2011,  as  seems  likely,  it  probably 
would not be overstated for the likely outcome in 2016 at an 
unchanged exchange rate combined with the secular trend. 
The  WEO  estimates  that  China’s  current  account 
surplus will rebound from 5.2 percent of GDP in 2010 to 
5.7 percent in 2011, 6.3 percent in 2012, and 7.8 percent 
by 2016. In contrast, one set of consensus private forecasts 
places the surplus at only 4.3 percent of GDP in 2011 and 
4.0 percent in 2012 (Blue Chip 2011). The discrepancy has 
not gone unnoticed: The Economist has pointed out that in 
April 2009 the IMF projected a current account surplus of 
9.3 percent of GDP for 2010 at a time when five investment 
banks were forecasting a surplus of only 6 percent of GDP for 
2010.1 But suppose the private-sector forecast of 4.3 percent 
in 2011 is correct. If the secular trend of 0.8 percent addition 
to the surplus annually continues, and if there is no further 
correction in the renminbi, the result would be a surplus of 
8.3 percent, about the same as the Fund’s projection. 
The second reason for adopting the IMF’s projection for 
China rather than using alternative private forecasts is that 
for our purposes, the Fund’s WEO assumption of unchanged 
exchange rates is precisely the concept we seek. In contrast, 
private forecasters are likely incorporating into their projec-
tions the influence of further renminbi appreciation in the 
future.2 Without the availability of a robust country-specific 
current account projection model for China parallel to the 
KGSR model for the United States, we see no compelling 
reason to depart from the IMF’s baseline projection for China’s 
current account at unchanged exchange rates.
1. “China’s Current-Account Surplus: Incredibly Misleading Forecasts?” 
Economist, April 28, 2011.
2. Note, however, that with exchange rate lags, the difference attributable to 
this source would be expected to show up substantially only by 2012 and after.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Appendix B updATing The CuRRenT 
ACCounT impACT pARAmeTeRs
In the symmetric matrix inversion model (SMIM) used to 
calculate FEERs (Cline 2008), an important parameter is the 
change in current account balance as percent of GDP for a 
1 percent change in the real effective exchange rate, or “γ”. 
This parameter takes account of the importance of exports in 
GDP, on the one hand, and the price elasticity of exports, on 
the other. Imposing an export price elasticity of unity for an 
economy with exports at 10 percent of GDP and 0.5 for an 
economy with exports as high as 100 percent of GDP, a simple 
formula relates the impact parameter to the size of exports 
relative to GDP.1
In previous rounds of our FEERs estimates, the primary 
source of the impact parameters was Cline (2005), which had 
applied 2003 data for exports of goods and services relative to 
GDP. By now these trade ratios have changed considerably in 
some important cases. This round of our estimates thus applies 
a new set of estimates for γ, based on the exports/GDP ratio in 
2010 (or, where not yet available, 2008). 
In the important case of the United States, the impact 
parameter  was  obtained  from  simulation  of  the  KGS 
(Krugman-Gagnon-symmetrical) current account model, thus 
taking account of the additional influence of induced capital 
services effects from the accumulation of net external debt. In 
Cline (2005, 96) and the previous rounds of FEERs estimates, 
this parameter was γ = –0.16, meaning that a 10 percent effec-
tive  depreciation  would  reduce  the  current  account  deficit 
by 1.6 percent of GDP (by year 5, with 90 percent of the 
adjustment occurring by year 3). In the 2011 revised version 
of the current account model (Cline 2011a, 2011b) the same 
simulation results in a parameter of γ = –0.21. This increase 
in the impact of the exchange rate on the current account as 
a percent of GDP by almost one-third reflects the sharp rise 
in exports of goods and services relative to US GDP, from 
9.2 percent of GDP to 12.5 percent (IMF 2011b), a slightly 
higher  proportionate  increase.  The  effect  of  updating  this 
parameter is to reduce the size of the dollar adjustment needed 
for any given target change in the current account as a percent 
of GDP.
Major increases in the ratio of exports to GDP also took 
place in the euro area, India, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and 
Switzerland.  However,  there  were  notable  reductions  in  the 
export ratio for Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, 
Canada, Colombia, and Venezuela. There was a slight decline in 
the median ratio of exports to GDP, from 0.37 to 0.33.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
1. γ = –1.056 x + 0.56 x2, where x is the ratio of exports of goods and services 
to GDP (Cline 2005, 252). The parameter is constrained to a maximum 
absolute value of 0.5.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 5   mA Y   2 0 1 1
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Table B.1     Export/GDP ratio and current account impact parameter
Country
Exports of goods and 
services/GDP
 Current account impact 
parameter γ
2003 2010 Previous  Updated
Pacific
Australia 0.181 0.221b –0.173 –0.206
New Zealand 0.280a 0.308b –0.252 –0.272
Asia
China 0.344 0.350b –0.297 –0.301
Hong Kong 1.722 2.124b –0.500 –0.500
India 0.146 0.241b –0.142 –0.222
Indonesia 0.312 0.248 –0.275 –0.227
Japan 0.118 0.160 –0.117 –0.154
Korea 0.382 0.543 –0.322 –0.408
Malaysia 1.149 1.035b –0.500 –0.500
Philippines 0.491 0.348b –0.383 –0.300
Singapore 1.580 2.343b –0.500 –0.500
Taiwan 0.584 0.638 –0.426 –0.446
Thailand 0.656 0.714 –0.452 –0.468
Middle East/Africa
Israel 0.384 0.378 –0.323 –0.319
Saudi Arabia 0.470 0.677b –0.373 –0.458
South Africa 0.440a 0.279 –0.356 –0.251
Europe
Czech Republic 0.758a 0.777b –0.479 –0.482
Euro area 0.147 0.225 –0.143 –0.209
Hungary 0.776a 0.814b –0.482 –0.488
Norway 0.460a 0.417 –0.367 –0.343
Poland 0.405a 0.416 –0.336 –0.342
Russia 0.350 0.303 –0.301 –0.269
Sweden 0.439 0.490 –0.356 –0.383
Switzerland 0.437 0.645 –0.355 –0.448
Turkey 0.302a 0.209 –0.268 –0.196
United Kingdom 0.251 0.288 –0.230 –0.258
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0.250 0.220 –0.229 –0.205
Brazil 0.169 0.138b –0.162 –0.135
Canada 0.378 0.293 –0.319 –0.261
Chile 0.364 0.402 –0.310 –0.334
Colombia 0.214 0.158 –0.200 –0.153
Mexico 0.284 0.302 –0.255 –0.268
United Statesc 0.092 0.125 –0.157 –0.210
Venezuela 0.370 0.232 –0.314 –0.215
a. 2006 
b. 2008
c. Special calculation; see text.
Source: Authors’ calculations. 